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III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Authorities Cited page in this brief: 
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
1. Amend. V 5, 6, 8, 21, 24 
2. Amend. VI 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 21, 24 
3. Amend. XIV 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 21, 24 
B. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1. ART. I §7 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 21, 24 
2. ART. I §12 5, 6, 7, 9, 19, 21, 24 
C. STATUTES 
(1) UTAH CODE ANN. §77-32-1 et 10, 11 
seg 
(2) UTAH CODE ANN. §77-1-6 10, 11 
(3) UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(f) 4 
(4) UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-2 04 13 
(5) UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-401(3) 13 
D. RULES 
(1) Rule 8(a), UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11 
(2) Rule 11, UTAH R. CRIM. P. 6, 11, 12, 15, 17, 23 
(3) UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) 5 
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(1) UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
CASES: 
(a) Arqersincrer v. Hamlin. 21 
407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
(b) Bovkin v± Alabama. 395 16, 17, 23 
U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 
1709, 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969). 
(c) In re Oliver. 333 U.S. 257, 
92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 499 21, 22 
[cited in Arqersinaer. supra. 
(d) Scott v^ . Illinois. 440 U.S. 22 
367 (1979). 
(2) UTAH APPELLATE COURT CASES: 
(a) State v. Abevta. 212 UtaM 
Adv.Rep.10 (May 5, 1993, Utah 16 
Sup. Ct.). 
(b) State v. Bakalov. 224 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 13 (Utah 1993). cert. 19 
granted, from 849 P.2d 629 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
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(c) State v. Dastrup. 818 Pages cited in brief 
P.2d 594 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 16 
(d) State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 16, 23 
(e) State v. Maguire, 184 18 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (1992). 
(f) State v. Ramirez. 818 19 
P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) cited 
in Bakalov, supra. at 13. 
(g) State v. Reyes. 220 8 
Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah 
Ct.App. filed Sept. 1, 1993). 
(h) State v\. Valencia, 776 18, 23 
P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
(i) Webster v\_ Jones, 587 P.2d 22 
528 (Utah 1978). 
IV. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order or judgment from a court 
of record in a criminal case and does not involve a conviction of 
a first-degree or capital felony. Accordingly, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(f) 
and Utah R.App.3(a). 
This case involves two misdemeanor convictions (one "A11 and 
one "B") joined in one case in the Fifth Judicial District Court, 
in and for Washington County, State of Utah. There is no longer a 
Circuit Court in Washington County, Utah. 
Date of judgment to be reviewed here is August 30, 1993. Date 
of Notice of Appeal is September 30, 1993. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All issues stated below constitute a claim of PLAIN ERROR. 
Since the same standard of review appears to apply to all issues, 
that standard and citations to authority thereto will be addressed, 
after a phrasing of the issues, in V.B. below. 
A. ISSUES ON APPEAL: 
1. Whether Defendant was entitled to be advised fully of his 
fundamental trial rights under the Constitution of the United 
States amends V, VX, and XIV, and under the Constitution of Utah 
Art. I §§12 and 7, and other applicable law; 
2. Whether Defendant was actually advised of those 
fundamental rights; 
3. Whether the" trial court's failure to advise defendant of 
those fundamental rights in fact violated defendant's rights to due 
process and fundamental trial rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
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Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and/or 
under Art. I §§12 and 7 of the Utah State Constitution. 
4. Whether the trial court made a sufficient inquiry under 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Crim.P. and/or, as a matter of state and/or 
federal law, otherwise made a proper determination as to whether 
defendant's pleas of guilty were voluntary, intelligent, and 
knowing, and that he understood the consequences of a guilty plea. 
5. Whether in the absence of either private legal counsel or 
the right to appointed counsel and/or in the absence of being 
advised of his fundamental trial rights, including the right to 
appointed counsel, defendant's pleas of "guilty" to a Class A 
misdemeanor and a Class B misdemeanor were in fact voluntary, 
intelligent, and knowing. 
6. Whether defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel, regardless of whether 
appointed or private, and whether he made a real choice, 
voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly, as to self-
representation. 
7. Whether the trial court's failure to properly determine 
whether defendant's pleas of "guilty" to a Class-A misdemeanor and 
a Class "B" misdemeanor were voluntary, intelligent, and knowing in 
fact violated defendant's rights to due process and fundamental 
trial rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments to 
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the United States Constitution and/or under Art. I §§12 and 7 of 
the Utah State Constitution. 
8. Whether Appellant-Defendant was denied his right, under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, and under Utah Const. Art. I §12, to assistance of 
counsel by the trial court's failure or refusal to do one or more 
of the following: 
(a) advise defendant of his right to assistance of counsel 
and of his right to court-appointed counsel if he was indigent 
or could not afford to hire a lawyer. 
(b) conduct an inquiry into defendant's indigency to 
determine whether defendant was entitled to court-appointed 
counsel. 
(c) appoint counsel to represent defendant. 
(d) advise defendant that defendant could either represent 
himself or hire private counsel or, rf defendant could not 
afford to hire private counsel, that he had the right to be 
provided at no cost to himself court-appointed counsel, and 
then conduct an inquiry into defendant's indigency. 
(e) determine whether defendant's self-representation was 
done voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly on his part. 
9. Whether the trial court met its affirmative duty to 
determine whether defendant, who was representing himself, did so 
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knowingly and intelligently. 
B. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW AND AUTHORITY 
Each of the issues above, and particularly when considered in 
toto, constitutes a claim of PLAIN ERROR. 
Appellant alleges that for each issue 
(a) an error exists; 
(b) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and 
(c) the error was harmful (i.e., absent the error, there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
complaining party. 
See State v. Reyes, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah Ct. App. ; 
filed September 1, 1993). 
By a "plain error" standard it is not necessary to give 
deference to the trial court's ruling or judgment when there is an 
absence in the record of any indication whatsoever that the trial 
court even addressed the fundamental trial rights of defendant, 
including the question of his indigency and entitlement to court-
appointed counsel. 
VI. VERBATIM PRODUCTION OF DETERMINATIVE LAW 
A. UNITED STATES CONST, amend V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
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indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
UNITED STATES CONST, amend VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
UNITED STATES CONST, amend XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONST. OF UTAH Art. I §7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
CONST. OF UTAH Art. I §12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
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have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-32-1: 
The following are minimum standards to be provided 
by each county, city and town for the defense of indigent 
persons in criminal cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state: 
(1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who 
faces the substantial probability of the 
deprivation of his liberty; 
(2) Afford timely representation by competent 
legal counsel; 
(3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities 
necessary for a complete defense; 
(4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to 
the client; and 
(5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right 
and the prosecuting of other remedies before or 
after a conviction, considered by the defending 
counsel to be in the interest of justice except for 
other and subsequent discretionary appeals or 
discretionary writ proceedings. 
UTAH CODE ANN §77-1-6: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
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(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district where the offense is 
alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 
30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits• 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final 
judgment,'be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the 
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights 
when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; 
and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict 
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, 
or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury 
has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon 
a judgment by a magistrate. 
[All rights are listed here because defendant was not advised 
by the court of any of these rights. However, U.C.A. §77-1-6(2)(b) 
and 2(c) appear to have been denied to defendant regardless of 
whether the court made defendant aware of his fundamental rights]: 
H. UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 8(a). 
A defendant charged with a public offense has the 
right to self representation, and if indigent, has the 
right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces 
a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. 
I. UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11. 
[See Appendix A as Rule 11 is lengthy. Especially pertinent 
are the portions of Rule 11 set forth below]: 
Rule 11(a) 
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Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant 
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant 
waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
Rule 11(e) 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no 
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept 
the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he 
or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does 
not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption 
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and 
that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial 
the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum 
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature 
of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
J. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-204: 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may 
be sentenced to imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding six months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not 
exceeding ninety days. 
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K. UCA §76-3-401(3) : 
A court may impose consecutive sentences for 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as 
defined in Section 76-1-401. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case; Course of Proceedings; and Disposition 
in District Court below: 
This is a two-count criminal case brought by the State of Utah 
in the Fifth Judicial District in and for Washington County. 
Defendant-Appellant Neal Elliot Hollingsworth was charged with 
assault, a Class-B misdemeanor, in Count I, and with "violations of 
the conditions for release after arrest for domestic violence", a 
Class-A misdemeanor, in Count II. 
The charges carry a maximum penalty of six months and one year 
of incarceration, respectively, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 7 6-3-
204(a) and (b) . The charges are not treated as infractions for any 
purpose and it is possible that the charges could result in maximum 
incarceration of one and one-half years, if consecutive pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(3) (in fact this is the case). 
On June 28, 1993, defendant was arraigned in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court. He was advised of the two charges but was 
not advised of any of his basic trial rights or of his rights to 
counsel. No inquiry into defendant's indigency was made nor Rule 
13 
11 colloquy done in any respect. No "Statement of Defendant" 
outlining rights was initialled or executed or prepared. Defendant 
was alone and unrepresented by counsel. No determination was made 
as to whether defendant's apparent "decision" to represent himself 
was voluntary, or knowingly, and intelligently made. 
The Court entered defendant's plea forthwith, after some 
hearsay "evidence" suggested by the state's prosecutor. June 28, 
1993 Tr.4:11-15. 
No other proceeding occurred until August 27, 1993, when 
defendant, unrepresented and still not having been advised of his 
fundamental trial rights, including right to counsel, appeared 
alone, entered a brief but interrupted statement, and was sentenced 
to consecutive jail terms totalling one and one-half years in the 
Washington County Jail. The Court made it clear that sentencing 
was on "the original charge of abuse and violation of protective 
order." Aug. 27, 1993 Tr.3:19-22. 
This appeal was filed on September 20, 1993. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
part VII-A above states the relevant portions of the record. 
Rather than restate the above, Appellant respectfully refers this 
court to the entire record, which is only six-and-one-half pages of 
the official transcript, and which is attached hereto as Appendices 
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B and C, respectively. 
The underlying issues in this case go to the absence of facts 
and to the absence of a record. 
Accordingly, Appendix B (June 28, 1993 Tr.pp 2-6 inclusive and 
Appendix C (August 27, 1993, Tr. 2-4) make it very clear that the 
trial court did not advise defendant of his trial rights, right to 
counsel, or any of the other issues raised in this appeal. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Under the constitutions, laws, and cases of the United States 
and of the State of Utah, a defendant in a criminal case must be 
advised of his fundamental trial rights, be provided counsel if 
indigent, should be advised of his right to counsel if he cannot 
afford counsel, and otherwise by law, particularly by Rule 11(e), 
Utah R.Crim.Proc. 
Defendant Neil Hollingsworth was not advised of his rights; no 
Rule 11 colloquy was held; he was not provided an attorney at any 
stage of the proceedings; he was even cut off from making a 
statement at sentencing; no inquiry as to whether his plea of 
guilty or self-representation were done in a voluntary, knowing, 
and intelligent manner. 
Defendant's eighteen-month sentence under circumstances set 
forth above blatantly violate federal and state constitutions, as 
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set forth herein. Defendant should be ordered released from 
custody and his conviction should be reversed. Because of the 
severity and breath of his due process violations and substantial 
jail time served, and because the culmination of plain error was so 
obvious and preventable, and to deter further lapses of judicial 
and state compliance with laws, this court should order the trial 
court to dismiss this case with prejudice and on the merits 
forthwith. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. Defendant was not advised of his fundamental trial rights. 
As a result, his conviction should be reversed. 
It is fundamental that in Utah "a trial court commits 
reversible error if it does not comply strictly with Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure11. State v. Abeyta, 212 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 10 (Utah 1993), citing State y^_ Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987). In State v. Dastrup, 818 P.2d 594, this court 
reversed and remanded even after a colloquy because the trial court 
did not ask defendant on the record if he understood that by 
pleading guilty he was waiving his fundamental rights. See Dastrup 
at 595. In accord "with strict scrutiny of the plea process is 
Bovkin v. Alabama. 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969): 
What is at stake for an accused facing death or 
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are 
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capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure 
he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of 
its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he 
leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later 
sought and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings 
that seek to probe murky memories. 
Id at 243-44, 
In the instant case the record is totally devoid of any of the 
following in taking defendant's plea or in arraignment or any other 
time: (1) that defendant has knowingly waived the right to counsel 
and does not desire counsel; (2) the plea is voluntarily made; (3) 
the defendant knows the right to presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, or any of the other 
rights set forth in Rule 11(3) (3); (4) that defendant knew the 
minimum and maximum sentence, or any of the other requirements of 
Rule 11(e)(5). 
The Court did appear to read both counts of the Information 
(June 28, 1993 Tr. 2:11-3:22) , but it is not clear that defendant 
did in fact understand Count II, the more serious charge, which 
arose from a civil restraining order (June 28, 1993 Tr: 3:4-5). 
After trying unsuccessfully to explain Count II to defendant, 
the Court merely said: 
Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do you want 
time to talk to an attorney? 
June 28, 1993 Tr. 3:23-24. 
Mr. Hollingsworth then stated "I'll enter a plea.11 Tr. 3:25. 
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After entering the plea (Tr.4:2) the Court admonished 
defendant, listened to hearsay "testimony" from the prosecutor, and 
postponed sentencing. Tr 4:3-5-5:13. The hearing concluded then. 
Not only was there no record of a Rule 11 colloquy, but there 
was also no affidavit of defendant or other evidence showing in any 
way that defendant understood his fundamental trial rights as set 
forth in Rule 11(e)(5)(c-e). In State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 
(Utah App. 1989), this court mandated reversal of the conviction, 
even though in that case there was some affidavit. In the instant 
case there was neither a guilty plea affidavit nor colloquy from 
the bench, mandating even more strongly that this case should be at 
least reversed. Since the errors were so obvious and "plain", and 
unjust, justice would be done if this court not only reversed but 
also ordered dismissal of the instant case with prejudice and on 
the merits upon remand to the trial court. Defendant does not 
demand the strictness sought in State v. Maguire, 184 Utah 
Adv.Rep.39 (1992), but does insist upon strict scrutiny and 
fundamental fairness when it comes to trial rights guaranteed under 
the Constitution of the United States and of Utah as specifically 
cited above. 
B. Defendant did not knowingly. voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive his right to legal counsel. 
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At the June 28, 1993 arraignment defendant was not advised in 
any way about his right to counsel nor advised of the consequences 
of entering a plea unrepresented. Neither was an inquiry, much 
less a finding, made regarding the "choice" defendant had to go 
forward unrepresented, nor whether his decision to represent 
himself was voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently made. 
The determinative case on point is State v. Bakalov, 224 Utah 
Adv.Rep.13 (1993). In Bakalov, the Utah Supreme Court, on 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, upheld this court's ruling 
in State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah Ct.App.1993). 
The Utah Supreme Court left no doubt as to the issues raised 
in Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment assistance of counsel 
requirements, nor of the Utah Constitutional counterpart in Art. I 
§§7 and 12: 
Precedent is clear. Defendants who knowingly and 
intelligently waive their right to assistance of counsel must 
be allowed to conduct their own defense.... [The trial court] 
never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation....advice. [Emphasis added]. 
Id at 13. 
State v. Ramirez, 818 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) is in accord and 
states that "the only fair way to proceed is to vacate defendant's 
conviction and remand the matter for retrial." (Cited in Bakalov, 
supra. at 13). 
The record in the instant case—or lack of record—speaks for 
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itself. No such colloquy or determination was made or even 
attempted. It is precisely cases like the instant one, where a 
naive young man without legal counsel and without even minimum 
required protection from the court and ends up with a year and a 
half of incarceration, where these protective principles are most 
needed in application. 
Because Mr. Hollingsworth1s due process violations were so 
plain and obvious, this court should not merely remand him back to 
a Kafkaesque trial environment for "redetermination,11 but should 
send a clear message to the legal system that plain and obvious 
error requires dismissal with prejudice and on the merits. Such 
deterrence has worked to deter overreaching police conduct, and 
should be considered now in other areas of the justice system. 
C. Defendant was not advised of his right to counsel nor to 
his right to court-appointed counsel nor was he provided any 
counsel whatsoever. 
The record, again, speaks for itself on this issue by its 
silence. The only reference anywhere to the issue of Mr. 
Hollingsworth1 s counsel is found in the June 28, 1993 transcript at 
3:23-25: 
[THE COURT]...Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do 
you want time to talk to an attorney? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I'll enter a plea. 
20 
That's all of it—in its entirety. 
The record suggests strongly here that in being denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, Mr. Hollingsworth 
was denied due process under the Fourteenth amendment and was also 
denied his right to not be compelled in a criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, thus violating the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. Further, in being 
placed in a position, unprotected, whereby Mr. Hollingsworth gave 
evidence against himself, without the voluntariness, intelligence, 
and knowingness of his plea having being established, Mr. 
Hollingsworth was also denied his rights under Art. I sections 
seven and twelve of the Utah Constitution. 
The case law seems quite clear that in a misdemeanor case 
where a defendant may be punished with six months or more in jail 
or prison, that the Sixth Amendment mandates appointment of counsel 
if defendant is indigent. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 
L.Ed.2d 530, 92 S.Ct 2006 (1972). In Argersinger, the Court was 
especially careful to point out that because of the "assembly-line 
character of misdemeanor proceedings", assistance of counsel may be 
especially important. Further, Argersinger suggests that a trial 
judge may choose to hot appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases but if 
it does not then imprisonment is forfeited as a sentencing option. 
See Argersinger at 536, where the Argersinger majority cited Iri re 
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Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 92 L.Ed. 682, 68 S.Ct. 499, whereby even a 
sentence of sixty days maximum required assurance that an indigent 
defendant in a criminal case had either been represented by counsel 
or had voluntarily and knowingly waived such counsel. 
The subsequent refinements to Argersinger do not apply to the 
facts in this case. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 
L.Ed.2d 383, 99 S.Ct. 1158, the Supreme Court held that a state 
court is not required to appoint counsel where imprisonment is 
authorized for a particular offense, but not actually imposed. In 
the instant case, eighteen months was actually imposed. 
Utah law requires no less than the federal standard, and 
perhaps substantially more. In Webster v. Jones, 587 P. 2d 528 
(1978) , the Utah Supreme Court held that the court must determine, 
as a question of fact, whether defendant is able to hire his own 
counsel. Id at 530. While the Code section relied upon in Webster 
appears to have been repealed, there is no indication that the 
principles involved in Webster are therefore moot or of no effect. 
That effectiveness should also apply to the mandatory language 
relied upon by the Court requiring the determination of indigency 
to be made by the Court at the time of first appearance. Any 
"election11 given the* Couft cannot go beyond current federal law in 
any event, and defendant is aware of no federal caselaw permitting 
a defendant to be incarcerated for eighteen months without even an 
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inquiry into indigency or other basic Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment protections. 
Further, Appellant herein incorporates all arguments in 
preceding sections of this appeal, including the absence of any 
Rule 11 colloquy. Mr. Hollingsworth was not found to be indigent 
nor to have voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived his 
right to counsel as required in State v. Gibbons, supra, and other 
law such as State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d. 1332 (Utah App. 1989) and 
in U.C.A. §77-35-11(5), particularly Rule 11(5) (now Rule 11(e). 
Further it is the burden of the trial court, not defendant or even 
of his counsel, if he has counsel, to establish compliance with 
Rule 11. Gibbons, supra, at 1312, citing Boykin v. Alabama. If 
this burden is so where a defendant has legal counsel, then how 
much more then is it required in the total absence of any legal 
counsel? 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant-Defendant Neil Hollingsworth was charged, and then 
sentenced to eighteen months incarceration, with no inquiry made by 
the trial court as to his indigency, nor whether a waiver of 
counsel, if any, * was done knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily. Mr. Hollingsworth was not advised of any of his trial 
rights, even in a crude approximation of Rule 11(e) requirements. 
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He was sentenced abruptly without even being able to argue 
mitigation, because he had no legal counsel to advocate for him at 
any critical stage, much less all of them. 
Appellant was thus denied his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his due 
process and trial rights under Article I sections Seven and Twelve 
of the Utah Constitution. He is at least entitled to full reversal 
of the judgment and sentence. Further, since this combination of 
plain error should have been so obvious to the court and to the 
State, Appellant should not be required to return to a hostile re-
arraignment, trial, and possibly more incarceration. This court, 
accordingly, should also order dismissal of the charges against Mr. 
Hollingsworth, on the merits and with prejudice, to deter such 
treatment of accused citizens in the future, where plain and 
obvious error continues to exist undeterred. 
Respectfully submitted this s\^> day of i^T/Crz://^6: 
1993. 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN 
Attorney for Appellant-Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OJ/^ERVICE^BY MAILING 
On the /IJ day of ([/ ^IAS^AA/^J , 1993, I do hereby 
certify that I mailed a true and complete copy of the above and 
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foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT by placing same in the 
United States Post Office, postage prepaid, to the following, to 
wit: 
Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 z 
Eric Ludlow 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 C,cKs^ 
\YTOVl HUNTSMAN 
iy for Appellant-Defendant 
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Cross-References. 
URCrP 30 
Harmless error, Rights of accused, Utah Const., Art. I, ^§ 7 
to 13, $ 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional time to plead. 
Waiver of objections 
Additional time to plead. 
Where original information did not state 
public offense and was amended so as to state 
public offense for first time, as amending infor-
mation in larceny prosecution so as to allege 
ownership of property alleged to have been sto-
Jan, it was equivalent of a new information re-
quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea 
thereto, and where defendant was not given 
time to plead to such information, court com-
mitted reversible error State v Jensen, 83 
Utah 452, 30 P 2d 203 (1934) 
Waiver of objections. 
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general 
legal rule that all objections, including those to 
proceedings in the circuit court, must be made 
before a guilty plea is entered or the objections 
will be waived. State v Humphrey, 794 P 2d 
496 (Utah Ct. App 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 823 P 2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur 2d Criminal Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *=» 261(1), 
gw §§ 433 to 438 263, 264. 
fcJ.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 355 et 
title 11. Pleas. 
fa) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
nted by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
fendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
Be time to confer with counsel. 
b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
on of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen-
| t may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insan-
jlf a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
|Court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
?A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
|When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
k
 trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
ly trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
C„counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
ie court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
3y ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
1^) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
py waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
&) the plea is voluntarily made; 
|3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
fright against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
ic trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
i open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
> of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
**> 
*the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
^the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
i of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
Je defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
We, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
•y be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
ability of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
*™e tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
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(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for fift 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal i t] 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any i_ 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not al 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending tiieHf 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other pa 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a le_ 
eluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement sKa 
approved by the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation 
sentence is not binding on the court, 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any p 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, un 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative 
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the pi* 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defe 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be! 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defend 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the pl| 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defe 
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, orai 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to] 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defer 
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated 
former Subdivisions (a) through (d) and (f) as 
present Subdivisions (1) through (4) and (8), 
respectively, and former Subdivision (e) as 
Subdivisions (5) and (7); divided Subdivision 
(1) into two sentences, substituting "The defen-
dant may" for "and shall" at the beginning of 
the present second sentence; substituted "may" 
for "shall" in the introductory language of Sub-
division (5); added "and" to the end of Subdivi-
sion (5)(f) and added Subdivision (5)(g); added 
Subdivision (6); substituted "may" for "shall" 
in Subdivision (8)(a); and made minor stylistic 
changes throughout the rule. 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, 
revised the subdivision designations, substitut-
ing letters for numbers and vice versa; inserted 
"or guilty and mentally ill" in the introductory 
paragraph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivi« 
sion (f); rewrote Subdivision (e)(3) to list mom 
rights; inserted "and if applicable, the mini-
mum mandatory nature of the minimum sen-
tence" in Subdivision (e)(5); added Subdivision 
(e)(8); deleted "that contemplates entry of a 
plea in the expectation that other charges will 
be dropped or dismissed" after "has been 
reached" in Subdivision (h)(2); added Subdivi-
sion (i); and made stylistic changes throughout 
the rule. 
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of 
pleas, plea discussions or related statements, 
Rule 410, U.R.E. 
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea 
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Compliance with rule. 




—Failure to explain. 
Consequences of plea. 
Nature and elements of offense. 
Right against self-incrimination. 
—Judicial burden. 
—Voluntariness. 
Absence of finding. 
Method of establishing. 
—Withdrawal. 
Plea agreements. 
—Court's participation in negotiations 
—Refusal of court to comply. 
—Sentencing. 
Cited. 
Compliance with rule. 
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with 
this rule in accepting a guilty or no contest 
plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the 
withdrawal of that plea. State v Gibbons. 740 
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), State v Smith, 812 
P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App! 1991) 
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH; MONDAY, JUNE 28, 1993 
-oOo-
THE COURT: 931500528, State of Utah versus Neal 
Elliot Hollingsworth. 
Is that your full true and correct name?-
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Your birth date is April the 9th, 
1973? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're charged in Count I with 
assault, a Class B misdemeanor. 
It's alleged that on or about the 26th day of 
June, 1993, Washington County, Utah, you attempted with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to another, 
or you threatened, accompanied by a show of force, to do 
bodily injury to another or committed an act with unlawful 
force or violence that caused bodily injury under the 
domestic violence statute. 
Do you understand what you're being charged 
with? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: In Count II, you're charged with 
violation of the conditions for release after arrest for 
domestic violence, a Class A misdemeanor. The same date; 
3 
1 same place. It's alleged that you violated a release 
2 agreement that you signed after having been arrested on a 
3 previous occasion for domestic violence. 
4 Do you understand that charge? 
5 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: No, I don't. 
6 THE COURT: When you were arrested the first 
7 time for spouse abuse — 
8 I MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Uh-huh. 
9 THE COURT: — you signed an agreement while you 
10 were in jail as a condition of your release. 
11 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I — I was — I didn't go to 
12 jail. 
13 MS. MANLEY: Your Honor, I think that in reading 
14 the report it sounded that way to me. And I just noticed 
15 in the Information that it was a violation of a protective 
16 order. 
17 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: That's — 
18 THE COURT: Ohf a civil one? 
19 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Yeah. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Then it was a civil 
21 protective order issued by this court restraining you from 
22 violence, and yet you violated that order. 
23 Do you wish to enter a plea at this time, or do 
24 you want time to talk to an attorney? 
25 MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I'U enter a plea. 



























THE COURT: And your plea? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Guilty, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hollingsworth, it appears to the 
Court that you might have a significant problem. 
Were the children witness to this abuse? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: No, they weren't. 
THE COURT: Normal people don't go around 
punching out each other. 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: In my defense, I did not 
punch her. I did not raise a fist to her. 
MS. MANLEY: Her claims are that he grabbed her 
by the shoulders. 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: That's — 
MS. MANLEY: And she also indicates that he put 
his hands around her throat and choked her. 
THE COURT: That's not the way we deal with 
problems, Mr. Hollingsworth. That's not the way normal 
people deal with problems. 
He entered a plea of not guilty to the other 
charge, and he's waiting trial which is scheduled for July 
the 26th. 
MS. MANLEY: Would you like to just postpone 
sentencing? 
THE COURT: Why don't we just postpone 
sentencing in the matter until you've completed your trial 
T 1 A T T T f\ "\ ITr*~K JTt TT T TXT 
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in the other case, Mr, Hollingsworth, and then we'll decide 
what to do with you. 
Either way, I think it would behoove you to get 
involved in counseling as soon as possible before somebody 
really gets hurt. You know, last year we had six homicides 
directly or indirectly related to spouse abuse situations. 
Four suicides. Lots of little kids left without moms or 
without dads. And it's just reached epic proportions. I 
don't know what's happening to people. They can't seem to 
reason and solve their problems without violence. 
Counseling is available to you, and it might — 
it might prevent your hurting somebody very badly or them 
hurting you, okay? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Okay. 
THE COURT: So with your permission, I'm going 
to continue sentencing until after the other case is 
resolved. 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter were concluded.) 
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH; FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1993 
-oOo-
THE COURT: Good afternoon. It's Friday, the 
27th day of August, 1993, and the time is 1:33. 
The first matter on the calendar is 931500528, 
State of Utah versus Neal Elliot Hollingsworth. 
MR. ROWE: Your Honor, it came to our attention 
that he had not been sentenced on this case before the 
Court. You had continued it to see what the outcome of the 
sentence Judge Eves was going to impose, and apparently 
this got lost in the shuffle and didn't get discovered 
until he came along in the district court on some motions 
on a third case. And — 
THE COURT: Yes. I did do some research on this 
scenario. The way this happened, this incident is alleged 
to have occurred on June the 26th, and Mr. Hollingsworth 
entered pleas of guilty to both the original charge of 
spouse abuse and violation of a protective order. Then 



























that she has reported in that case noncompliance. 
MR. ROWE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And then there's a new incident 
alleged, more aggravated than either of these two. 
What is your recommendation? 
MR. ROWE: I'm recommending that he be sentenced 
to six months jail, consecutive on each count, subject to 
review. 
THE COURT: Anything you'd like to say, 
Mr. Ho11ingsworth? 
MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: I have every intention of 
obeying the orders to go to those classes. And I even 
called the place and — I didn't talk to Rickell 
personally. It must have been to her secretary. And I 
explained to her that I couldn't make it on one week, 
because I was working late. And she said — she took my 
phone number and said she would call me the next week. And 
on the next week, I was — 
THE COURT: Well, that's not why you're here 
today. You're not here for not complying with the order, 
you're here to be sentenced on the original charge of abuse 
and violation of a protective order. 
And by my count, we have four or five separate 
incidents involving violence; is that not correct? 
MR. ROWE: Yes. We have at least three. And I 
r i A T T T /-> -»*-. 
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would — I think the most aggravated factor is that he's — 
in this latest one, he and/or his counselor are attempting 
to minimize his knowledge of — that he was restrained from 
engaging in this type of activity. And the clear defiance 
of the court order doesn't seem to get his attention. So I 
don't know what else we can do but keep him out of society. 
THE COURT: It will be the judgment and sentence 
of the Court, Mr. Hollingsworth, that on Count I, you serve 
six months in the Washington County Jail. On Count II, you 
serve one year in the Washington County Jail. Those cases 
will be consecutive. Those sentences will be consecutive. 
I will, however, review after the first year. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
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